We are a friendly group of guys who enjoy gaming together in Fighter Ace as well as the IL2 series. We have been around since the early days of Airwarrior and, although only a handfull remain, we are still around. The following is a history of the actual NJG of the German Luftwaffe.

*Note: Although our name is based on the Luftwaffe of WWII, we do not support or promote Nazi ideas or actions.

History of the Nachtjagd

Introduction

Nachtjagd?Es wird nie dazu kommen! , [Göring,1939]

The war began "too early" for the new Luftwaffe. So it did for the night defense wing. It seems to be commonly believed that the fast and almost improvised organization of the German night fighting wing is due to a lack of estimation in an incoming enemy night counter-offensive war. Such a forecast was, according to the accurate war plans, very remote. Though the key of the air power of the Luftwaffe at the outbreak of the conflict was well known to be its attack and planning capacities, and not its defensive or numeric power. On the other hand, combat records demonstrate that the German aircraft stocks and technology weren't in such high standards at the beginning of the war as they were later in 1943, before the decadence of the whole organization.

Under the strategic point of view, and in view of its weaknesses, the Oberkomando der Luftwaffe (OKL) concentrated its efforts in war tactics in which the prevention of any enemy counterattack had a decisive role ("Blitzkrieg"). Poland, Belgium, Holland, Norway and France invasions were best examples of the application of such theories: elimination of the enemy air-power and support to ground forces. Although these victim countries didn't have a well organized or powerful airforce the way the RAF or USAF was going to show themselves later on the war.

Early Nachtjagd

Since its foundation, the Luftwaffe was developing and improving night bombing tactics but, surprisingly, was not studying any kind of airborne night defence. This might have been because the RLM relied on the basis that the powerful AAA would accomplish this duty with enough effectiveness. We must also remember that Flak-artillery in the German military organization, unlike other countries, has always been under the Luftwaffe control instead of the army's.

Experiments in Spain

Some experiments took place combining searchlights with Ar 68 E and F both in Spain and in Germany, but little is known about the specific results. The aircraft in question were based at La Cenia, Southern Catalonia intended to be used as twilight and provisional night fighters. The aircraft they were coded; 9-1 9-2 and9-3. Used occasionally for ground attack during the battle of Ebro, and the advance into Catalonia Jan-Feb 1939. Handed to the nationalists at the end of the war, under command of Capt. Javier Murcia. Two of theseArado’s were still flying in 1945, when their serial code was changed to C-11. This experiments had little or none influence in what was going to be the Nachtjagd.

Before the War

In 1938 a was established a Lehrgeschwader at Greifswald equipped with Bf 109. This was an experimental squadron practising night fighting manoeuvres with the aid of search-lights. The fundaments of their training operations were similar to the 1941’s "illuminated technique": an aeroplane can be attacked when is visible. The searchlights would uncover from the dark the enemy planes allowing the night fighters to attack. This tactics operatively was limited to good weather and poor cloud conditions, but in 1939 it was considered that the enemy as well needed the same conditions!

The first man to contrast Hitler’s will of building the Luftwaffe only as an offensive weapon was Ernst Udet, whose insistence made possible the develop of the experimental night fighting units. This situation continued even after the war outbrake. Between 1939 and 1940 (N)JG 53 was also developing techniques for night fighting actions. This unit was equipped with Ar 68 E’s and F’s (such as those used earlier in Cenia) which were already obsolete but suitable; this aircraft was chosen because of its open canopy which enabled an all-around good visibility, something very important in the night when AI electronic equipment wasn't still available.

Evolution

Following these experiences, other experimental units were created in Norway and Denmark. At Jever, since December 1939 was established under Hauptmann Blumensaat IV/(N)/JG 2 as well as 10./JG 26 the "top guns" of Luftwaffe at Heligoland, under Obl. Steinhoff. This unit was equipped with old (but still aggressive) Bf 109-D’s -this was a syntom of the priority this kind of experiments received in a Blitzkrieg oriented Luftwaffe confident of its success. The Bf 109 was not a suitable plane for blind flying operations because the visibility its narrow and deep cockpit could offer to its pilots was insufficient by far. Therefore some of the 109-D’s employed were modified by deleting its canopies to improve night vision. This was of little use anyhow and very few victories were scored by these experimental units in early 1940. About these victories little is known and their existence is in doubt. By that time of the war both attacking and defending air forces needed full-moon and clear nights to enable night operations. This was the "full moon" night war period. In Norway was also established the IV. (N)/JG 77. This unit was equipped with the Me 109-C and D. Everything changed when the RAF developed the necessary technology to guide its bombers to their targets with-out the aid of any visual guidance. For long time the Luftwaffe HC examined wether a night defence organization was to be established or not.

When Hitler’s Western Offensive initiated and the RAF decided to bomb German targets during the night the question was revived and fo-cused during the whole Battle of Britain. Since the very first RAF. night bombing on German territory the Luftwaffe had to fulfil this new role, late enough to use airframes origi-nally not projected to become night fighters. It was thought that the well-trained searchlight and Flak units were powerful enough to halt any night attack. The lack of results showed the evidence of facts.

The hurried situation into which some Luftwaffe officers and commanders were to be creating from nothing new tactics and obtain some results was much too in evidence at the end of the French Campaign when Falck received personally from Göring the order to form the first night fighting Geschwader. In April 1940 Hauptmann Falck’s I./ZG 1, following the ex-ample of 10./JG 26, is transferred to Aalborg in Denmark to begin the development of night fighter tactics. The first victory the German night fighter wing scored was attained in the night of 20/07/1940 at 02:00by Werner Streib; more about this first step is explained in part two of this book. Thus we could resume the premises for the late establishing night fighter forces as follows: ¨ The Luftwaffe would have such an air technological superiority that eventual enemy bombing operations over German territory would be compelled to operate in darkness. ¨Such eventual bombing operations could anyhow not be numerous because of the technological limitations of the air-warfare of the time. ¨ Any of the enemy night bombers would have to deal both with the defensive Flak and searchlight belt. By that time in the war, the first RAF. night raids over German territory made from necessity science and Josef Kammhuber due to his excellent organization qualities is appointed to the organisation of the night defence system.

The following table shows the development of night fighter tactics from WW1 to 1945.

Chronology of night-fighter tactic development.

1917 to 1918 first developments of night fighting techniques

1936 to 1937 some experiments take place but with insufficient efforts; too little results due to insufficient technical support, thus the program is abandoned

1938 to 1939 no special devices are developed but a few experimental night fighting units are kept

1940 June Falck develops the first techniques, builds up the first Geschwader

1940 to 1941 night chasing guided from the ground, limited altitude to 5000 Mts.

1941 use of the Illuminated night fighting method

1941 to 1942 Himmelbett defence method with on board FuG radar for target seeking

1942 radar (AI) on board and infrared devices are developed and employed with success. The range of the Würzburg radar used in the Himmelbett system is enlarged from 35 to 60-70 Kms.

1943 to 1944 "WildeSau" single engine independent night fighters

1944 to 1945 Lichtenstein SN2 board radar and traditional ground controlled guidance.

In Summer 1942 the RAF introduces in the role of night intruder the famous De Haviland Mosquito transforming the already difficult night defence of the Reichin a very difficult problem for the RLM. From the ground training point of view the Luftwaffe lacked in preparation of pilots in not teaching them the instrumental flying technique. In this way day fighter pilot were notable to be converted to the night fighter role.

The gaining of priority for the German night fighter was to be paid with the first RAF. 1000-bomber raids such as the one over Lübeck and Cologne in 1942. The defence was then organized with Lichtenstein target-seeking devices and new cannons such as the schräge Musik on the backs of the Junkers 88s.

The Kammhuber Line

It was in July 1940 that Generalmajor Josef Kammhuber took in charge the establishment of the Nachtverteidigung (night protection of the skies) in Luftwaffe coming directly from a P.O.W. camp in France. He created a night defensive line, from the Isle of Sylt to Scheldemündung, later to be known to friends and foes as the Kammhuber line. It consisted in a double defensive line of searchlights and Flak artillery. Kammhuber gained special powers to overrule the RLM’s T.A. for the choice of series production aeroplanes. This was one of Hitler's system for solving emergency situations.

In October of the same year the FuMG 65 also known as Würzburg-Gerät radar system enters service. It is a very powerful system with a range of 35 Kms. Later, in 1942, its range is enlarged up to 70 Kms. In summer 1941 Telefunken presented the first prototype of the board radar Lichtenstein system at 490 MHz. This was the beginning of the development of the night-fighter. In the first months of 1942 the FuG 212 Lichtenstein C-1 was tested by NJG/1. in Holland installed in Ju 88s. The device was not welcomed by all the pilots in service; for instance Helmut Lent a famous Pilot with the amazing 102 air night victories, was not enthusiastic of the device, preferring the traditional vision chasing. The evident improvement achieved with the board radar was a little compensated by the loss of 40 kms/h.

The Himmelbett System

The main system for intercepting RAF. night bombers before their arrival to the target was the Himmelbett radio system. It consisted in the distribution of radio beacons, for orientation and reference, with Freya devices for early warning with a range of 60 to 150 km each. These devices helped to orientate the denominated Würzburg-Gerät-A, or Würzburg Rot, with a range of 30 km to track the echoes of the arriving bombers, get data about distance, altitude, speed and direction and send these data to a ground control station (Leitstand). In the control station was a glass table, with the map of the Himmelbett area covered, on which a red beam indicating the position of the enemy over the sky was projected. These stations were also nicknamed "movie theatres" and "combat opera houses" for they were organized as a theatre in which the enemy bombers were the actors projected into the screens just like in the cinemas. The control station was connected simultaneously with a Würzburg-Gerät-B, or Würzburg-Grün, which was the main link between the night fighters and the control station. This device sent data about the enemy position to the fighters as well as data about the position of the night fighters themselves back to the control station. Here a blue or green beam would-be projected on the Seeburg 14-meter glass table indicating friends and foes’ positions. When it was waited to get the position of enemy planes, a night fighter circled over the radio beacon in a waiting area. A second fighter awaited in readiness on the ground as well as a third reserve in alert. The Himmelbett system was a huge net not all over the German territory but over the tactic ways between England and possible targets on Germany. Stations were connected the one with the other on the telephone. So the route of enemy bombers covered many Himmelbett stations before arriving to the target -which was easily found by the data exchanged between all stations involved. Despite the great amount of personnel and technology involved, the control stations were always criticized for they could not ensure the interception of the enemy bombers. Its weak point was that only one fighter was ready and flying for each area. In 1942 there were only 6 Nachtjagdgruppen organized for the protection of the Reich.

The "wilde Sau"

When the RAF successfully used electronic counter-measures against the achievements of German technology on radio interception the German night defence seemed helpless. Then Major Hajo Hermann, a young and experienced bomber pilot with a feeling for new things proposed a new strategy to the High Command. This young pilot accounted among his life experiences over 300 missions over England

,Malta and the Arctic. He knew very well the problems the enemy bombers might find in they way to their targets and managed to invent a new strategy reverting the enemy advantages against them. Hermann thought that if it was impossible to intercept RAF bombers by using their H2S navigation system navigational system then it was useless to forbid lights at night in the possible target cities making impossible for the defenders to fly and, therefore, simplifying things to the enemy. So the cities should be full enlightened with any kind of devices to let Luftwaffe and Flak visually find the bombers and intercept them. He observed that the bombers were illuminated in the area of the target cities by Flak's searchlights even for some minutes. Instead of hoping in random hits of the Flak, he thought that a Flak-clear area could be available for flying interceptors. The interceptors should be fast and light single engine aeroplanes such as those used in day fighting role. Me 109-G’s and FW 190’s should then be used guided from the ground by radar and helped by the ground lights and flares to engage contact with the enemy.

These tactics were not intended by Hermann as a substitute of the current standard but only to give a further help. Helped by his influent friend Major Werner Baumbach, he managed to receive audience with Göring in 27 June 1943. Göring immediately ordered the establishment of an Erprobungskommando for Hermann with ten Fw 190 and Me 109 with their trainer. The a/c were fitted with 300-liter fuel drop tanks drop tanks to have at least a 2 hour autonomy. This point was very important for the interceptors should not only patrol but also have enough time to engage and possibly shot-down the enemy when found. In the night of ¾ July 1943 Hermann began the first mission with a Flak-free area over 6500 m in the Ruhr. RAF bombers were not directed to the Ruhr but to Cologne! Hermann and his men flew rapidly to the city where the Flak did not even know about their existence and fired at anything that moved in the sky. That night the tactic was simple: each one for himself, and any visible bomber shell be shot down. The end of the first mission was a success. Only one of ten fighters did not come back. Twelve RAF. bombers were shot-down. Göring immediately gave Hermann an entire Geschwader of wilde Sau pilots. The new Geschwader was named JG 300 and Hermann was its Kommodore.

At end of July, Colonel von Lossberg, a former bomber pilot and departamental chief of T.A., proposes a further modification in tactics: night fighters should go on pursuit of the enemy bombers unobstructed by the confines of their Himmelbett zones. Once in the bulk of the enemy bombers they could choose their targets. The day after (30 July) a commission established by Milch, Kammhuber, Weise, Galland and Streib examined and approved this proposal. According to this decision Hermann’s JG 300 was reinforced. During the night of the tragedy of Hamburg, end of July, Göring phoned to Hermann and said to him that "Germany was on his hands". It was too late and not even the successful system of the wilde Sau could change the destiny of the German major cities. In that night a dozen of wilde Sau shot down many bombers. But many, out of seven hundred were not enough to play a part. The first operation in force of the wilde Sau was taken in the night between 17 and 18 August 1943 when, alerted by the arrival of a 20-Mosquito raid over Berlin took off to defend the capital. The RAF target was other: the Mosquitos were just a faint to concentrate German defences over the capital instead of the main target which was Peenemünde, where research and development programmes and testing of new weapons were taking place since the outbreak of the conflict. As soon as the new alarm was given the situation was pretty clear. The first squadron arrived to the place was Major Walther Ehle’s from St. Trond in Belgium. The first victory that night was a Lancaster at 01:35. It was one of 40 shot down and other 32 damaged beyond repair. In the night of 23 / 24 August 1943 in a RAF raid against Berlin the wilde Sau shot down 56 bombers and British night-fighters. In the night of 1 September 1943 47 more RAF planes were shot down near Berlin, and three days later another 26. Hermann then received the order to establish an entire Division formed by three wilde Sau Geschwader but the hard Winter of 1943 was coming. Difficulties and bad weather were both against the wilde Sau operations.

RAF bombers then changed navigational tactics using better targeting systems in order not to need any visual contact with the target. Hermann then arranged lights and light flares and bombs to explode below the bombers so that the fighters, flying at high altitude, could see the silhouettes of the enemy bombers below.

The worst enemy of the wilde Sau was the bad weather causing many casualties, even more than those during the battles. Only experienced pilots could fly their planes through the fog and land in their airfield without incidents. Unfortunately many of the new pilots had not such experience and were notable to find their way back home. The end of the wilde Sau time arrived when the Lichtenstein SN2 board radar came into operational status so the 30th Jägerdivision was divided. Hermann was awarded the Knight’s Cross with Swords and Oak’s leaves and was between Oberst and Inspector of the Reich’s air defence. He was later Kommandeur of the 9. Fliegerdivision and Rammkommandos Elbe, a day ramming fighter commando especially established against the B-17’s. Hermann ended the war in the hands of the Russian when he was captured behind the Russian lines as he was looking for a friend that was shot down. He came back to Germany ten years after the war being one of the last Aces released by the Russian.